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Introduction and Background
T
his article will discuss why the use of two types 
of red teams - analytical and physical - to iden-
tify and then simulate ‘suicide bomber threat 
scenarios’ is necessary for the force protection 
training of deploying Canadian military units. 
Red teaming as a discipline can be divided into two basic 
forms: (1) analytical red teaming, which is diegetic in nature; 
that is, based upon descriptive products and decision support 
functions and (2) physical red teaming, which is mimetic in 
nature; that is, derived from live-action and role playing-based 
training with an opposing force (OPFOR) deployed against a 
friendly military unit.1 These forms of red teaming are inti-
mately linked, create synergies when utilized together, and 
should be fully harnessed for Canadian military force protec-
tion requirements. One of the greatest lost opportunities of 
utilizing red teams in the past has been the decoupling of these 
two very different forms of red teams from one another.  
The article will be divided into three main sections that 
a) provide general guidance concerning how to determine 
enemy intent (and capability) via analytical red teaming, b) 
show how to determine and prioritize the types of likely sui-
cide bomber threat scenarios a deployed force will face, and 
c) show how to conduct the physical red teaming of these 
identified higher priority suicide bomber threat scenarios. It 
will conclude with some general observations concerning the 
value both forms of red teaming provide for the force protec-
tion requirements of deploying Canadian military units 
against the threat of suicide bombings. 
A brief overview of the threat suicide bombings repre-
sent to military forces and the globalization of this terrorist 
and insurgent technique needs to be provided for context. 
Contemporary suicide bombings have been taking place since 
the early-1980s, and have been directed at both military and 
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People run from a suicide car bomb blast outside the German embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, 17 January 2009.
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civilian target sets.2 The first such bombing can be directly 
traced back to a military engagement that took place during 
the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. The celebrated action of 
Hossein Fahmideh, a 13-year old boy who destroyed an Iraqi 
tank at the Battle of Khorramshahr in 1982, was the focal 
event. Hossein sacrificed his own life, detonating a satchel 
charge underneath an Iraqi tank in a final act of desperation.3 
This technique, which resonated with the cult of the martyr in 
Iran, quickly evolved and became an operational component 
of the Hizbollah organization, which was composed of former 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and was exported to Lebanon 
in the fight against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). These 
suicide bomber attacks, specifically utilizing vehicular-borne 
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), targeted Israeli mili-
tary convoys and assets. In addition, foreign military and 
diplomatic facilities were targeted and destroyed by Hizbollah 
operatives.4 The use of suicide bombings has since spread 
globally, and has been used in stand alone attacks, in combi-
nations with multiple suicide bombers, or secondary avenue 
of approach VBIEDs, and alongside active aggressor assault 
and hostage-taking operations. The 
Tamil Tigers engaged in their first sui-
cide bombing in 1987, Hamas in 
1993, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in 
1994, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
in 1996, Al Qaeda in 1998, the 
Chechens in 2000, the Al –Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades in 2002, and the 
Taliban in the 2003/2004 period.5 
Since the early-1980s, well over a 
thousand contemporary suicide bomb-
ings have taken place, with the vast 
majority of incidents clustered in the 
Israeli area of operations, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Canadian military forces deployed 
overseas have not been immune to 
these attacks—a number of instances 
of Canadian fatalities and 
casualties have been docu-
mented in Afghanistan—and 
they are expected to continue 
sporadically into the future 
while Canadian forces remain 
deployed in that theatre of 
operations. 
Determining Enemy 
Intent (and Capability) 
via Analytical Red 
Teaming
The value of analytical red teams that focus upon the 
threat of opposing force use of 
suicide bombers is to provide 
early warning of enemy intent 
and capability. Ideally, this 
early warning will be provided 
in the pre-deployment phase 
prior to a Canadian military 
force entering a threat environment. This function would exist 
at the ‘strategic early warning’ level with the analysis focusing 
upon general historical suicide bombing threats through cur-
rent theatre of operations I&W (indications and warnings), 
and actual suicide bombing incidents targeting allied military 
forces. Once a Canadian military force has been deployed into 
a foreign theatre, ‘operational early warning’ should then be 
concentrated upon. This type of analysis will concern itself 
with current theatre of operations I&W pertaining to Canadian 
military forces, and actual incidents targeting those forces and 
their in-theatre allies.
For example, at the ‘strategic early warning’ level of 
analysis, the various terrorist and insurgent groups that engage 
in suicide bombings have signatures which betray the patterns 
and techniques that they utilize when engaging in such opera-
tions. In 2003, this author was able to determine the general 
patterns of suicide bomber delivery modes and target sets by 
the major groups involved in these activities. These patterns 
can be viewed in Table 1 and Table 2.6
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At the scene of the aftermath of a suicide bomber attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 27 November 2006, the 
Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team Quick Response Force responded to secure the site along Highway 4.
Table 1 Source : Coun te r-OPFOR Program. NLECTC-West©2003
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Major Groups by “Suicide Bomber” Delivery Mode
Group Personnel (Human) Vehicular Aircraft Vessel
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Yes No No No
Al Qaeda Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chechens Yes Yes No No
Hamas Yes Yes No No
Hezbollah Yes Yes No No
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) Yes No No No
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Yes Yes No Yes
Tamil Tigers (LTTE) Yes Yes No Yes
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These tables were derived from a multi-year study related 
to the historical analysis of terrorist and insurgent group sui-
cide bombing incidents. Such incidents, when tracked over 
time, readily provide data points concerning the range of casu-
alties (minimums and maximums) of successful operations and 
other important information including the time of day, type of 
attack, number of perpetrators, and so on. Hamas, for example, 
became very adept at utilizing suicide anti-personnel devices 
on public buses in Israel while the PKK in Turkey went through 
a pattern of utilizing women suicide bombers, some of whom 
feigned pregnancy, in order to appear non- threatening to tar-
geted police forces. Additionally, prior to US deployment of 
military forces into Iraq in March 2003, this author and a col-
league meeting at the County Emergency Operations Center 
(CEOC) in Los Angeles, California, came across initial I&W 
concerning threatened suicide bombing use against American 
forces. This prompted them to begin data collection in 
December 2002 on this potential threat and, as a result, to be 
able to accurately project that such 
opposing force operations would be 
take place during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.7 One outcome of this red 
team analysis was that this author 
was able to provide training at a 
Force Protection Conference for the 
I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
in Camp Pendleton, California, in 
November 2003, regarding this 
threat. He specifically focused upon 
the historical Hizbollah use of 
VBIEDs ramming and detonating in 
the middle of Israeli conveys in 
Southern Lebanon in the early-1980s 
as one of his major areas of concern 
for Marine units deployed in Iraq 20 
years later. 
After Canadian forces are 
deployed into a theatre of opera-
tions, such as Afghanistan, the 
‘operational early warning’ level of 
analysis should then become dominant. At this level, opposing 
force tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) should be 
included in the operational early warning being conducted. 
For Canadian military force protection needs, this red team 
analysis should include I&W and the Canadian operational 
experience in that theater of operations and/or against that 
specific opposing force, such as Al Qaeda elements, if 
Canadian forces have engaged them in earlier deployments. 
Canadian operational experience is gained through opposing 
force suicide bombing plots, both failed attempts, and success-
ful attacks that result in casualties and fatalities inflicted upon 
its military forces. These operational level lessons learned 
should be broadened to include opposing force suicide bomb-
ing operations targeted against allied and coalition forces 
alongside which Canadian military forces are deployed. A 
basic example of this red team analysis pertaining to success-
ful Al Qaeda and Taliban suicide bombing operations that 
resulted in Canadian military fatalities has been highlighted.
Table 2 Source : Coun te r-OPFOR Program. NLECTC-West©2003
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Major Groups by “Suicide Bomber” Target Set
Group Civilian(Personnel)
Military/LE*
(Personnel) VIP Transit Aircraft Vessel
Buildings/
Infrastructure
al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades
Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes
Al Qaeda Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Chechens Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Hamas Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes
Hezbollah Yes Yes No No No No Yes
Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK)
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
Palestine Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ)
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Tamil Tigers (LTTE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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A British soldier watches security personnel standing in front of vehicles destroyed in Kabul, 
Afghanistan by a suicide attack, 15 November 2005.
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Twelve fatalities have been identified 
via various modes of suicide bombings 
(individual, bicycle, and VBIED) directed 
at Canadian military forces while 
deployed in Afghanistan since early- 
2002. This represents just under eight 
percent of the total Canadian military 
fatalities that have taken place in 
Afghanistan, with the vast majority of 
these fatalities attributed to IEDs, both 
simple pressure and command-detonated devices. The follow-
ing list documents these suicide bomber inflicted fatalities on 
Canadian military forces (quoted from news sources):8
•	 A suicide bomber in Kabul, Afghanistan, killed one 
Canadian soldier [Corporal Jamie Brendan Murphy] and 
wounded three others, officials said [January 27, 2004]. 
Nine civilians were hurt. Ali Jan Askaryar, head of police 
in the western district of Kabul, where the blast occurred, 
said the Canadians were part of a three-vehicle patrol 
and “a terrorist jumped on one of the vehicles and blew 
himself up.”9
•	 On July 22, 2006, Corporal Jason Patrick Warren and 
Corporal Francisco Gomez were killed by a suicide car 
bomb in Kandahar…. 40 minutes after the first bomb - a 
second suicide bomber blew himself up in the middle of 
the crowd that had gathered, inflicting fatal injuries on 
Qodus [a member of the production crew filming the 
aftermath of the first suicide bombing] and four other 
civilians and injuring many others.10
•	 On August 8, 2006, Corporal Andrew James Eykelenboom, 
1st Field Ambulance, was killed by a suicide car bomb at 
Kandahar Airfield.11
•	 On August 22, 2006, Corporal 
David Braun, 2nd Battalion, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian 
Light Infantry, was killed by 
a suicide bomber in 
Khandar.12
•	 A suicide bomber on a bicy-
cle detonated near NATO 
t roops  in  sou the rn 
Afghanistan Monday morn-
ing [September 18, 2006] as 
they handed out gifts to chil-
dren, killing four Canadian 
soldiers [Corporal Keith 
Morely, Corporal Shane 
Keating, Private David Byers, 
and Corporal Glen Arnold] 
and wounding dozens of oth-
ers, including civilians, 
according to the Canadian 
military and NATO… The 
Canadian soldiers— part of 
NATO’s  In te rna t iona l 
Security Assistance Forces— 
were patrolling the Panjwayi District of 
Kandahar Province when the attack took 
place at 9:30 a.m. local time, according 
to ISAF.13
•	 Two Canadian soldiers [Corporal 
Albert Storm and Chief Warrant Officer 
Robert Girouard] were killed on 
November 27 [2006] at approximately 
8:35 am (Kandahar time) when their 
Bison Light Armoured Vehicle was attacked by a suicide 
bomber driving a car laden with explosives. The incident 
occurred on Highway 4 between Kandahar Airfield and 
Kandahar City. There were no other Canadian casual-
ties.14
•	 Colonel Geoff Parker became the highest ranking 
Canadian to die in Afghanistan since Ottawa first com-
mitted troops here in 2002 when he was killed Tuesday 
[May 18, 2010] in a suicide bombing on the eastern out-
skirts of Kabul. Colonel Parker, of the Royal Canadian 
Regiment, was traveling with US troops at about 8 a.m. 
local time when a suicide bomber driving a mini-van with 
nearly a ton of explosives packed inside swerved into 
their convoy of three armoured SUVs, killing five 
Americans and at least 12 Afghan civilians who were pas-
sengers in a nearby bus.15
This list - in effect, very basic database entries - can be 
further developed along with Canadian military wounding 
incidents and failed suicide bombing attempts that resulted in 
no Canadian casualties.  This compilation provides some 
insights into the types of suicide bombing incidents to which 
deployed Canadian forces have been subjected in Afghanistan. 
Royal Air Force Senior Aircraftsman Katie Price (centre) plays the role of an insurgent detonating a sui-
cide bomb during Exercise Desert Eagle at the Nevada Test and Training Range, 16 March 2011.
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“Derived from the historical 
lessons learned, the threat 
scenarios themselves 
should then begin to be 
identified for Canadian  
military deployments.”
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Developing Suicide Bomber Threat Scenarios
While still the domain of analytical red teaming, the development of the suicide bomber threat scenarios 
also requires that a few physical red teaming specialists are 
involved. This should be considered an A-Red Team 
(Analytical) and P-Red Team (Physical) approach. It should be 
noted that very few individuals are able to effectively fulfill 
both the role of a red team analyst and a red team operator. 
When such individuals are identified, they should be consid-
ered a valuable commodity and allowed to serve as members 
of both red teams for continuity, and to ensure that ‘analytical 
intent’ is being followed at the physical training level.
Derived from the historical lessons learned, the threat 
scenarios themselves should then begin to be identified for 
Canadian military deployments. One approach is to first create 
a basic historical threat matrix (See Table 3). The various 
activities of a deployed military force are listed and then 
cross-referenced with basic suicide bomber threat categories. 
The one created in Table 3 provides low, medium, and high 
levels of concern, based upon the author’s analysis of which 
threat scenarios are more likely to take place than others, as 
derived from datasets of global suicide bombing incidents.16 
This initial analysis, however, is notional in nature and should 
only provide a starting point. This basic matrix would then be 
modified with the seven suicide bombing incidents that took 
place against Canadian military forces in Afghanistan (listed 
earlier) as in-theatre data points. Additionally, wounding only 
incidents and failed attacks (in which Canadian military forces 
suffered no casualties) can be added, along with suicide 
bomber attacks on allied forces. Some form of basic weighted 
values approach could be taken, where incidents with deaths 
are given a basic weighted number, and wounding and failed 
attacks being given a lower weighted value. Additionally, the 
columns representing the activities of the deployed military 
forces is subject to modification, with some activities being 
removed and others being added. Further, the activities them-
selves could be weighted, with a large amount of Canadian 
soldiers barracked at a specific location given a much higher 
weighted value, due to what the human and political loss 
would represent to the deployment in Afghanistan. This is not 
an exact science—far from it—the intent is to determine what 
the threat has been to Canadian forces, and which activities of 
those forces are more of a concern (valued) than others, so 
that the threat scenarios of importance can be identified for 
red teaming and force protection training purposes.
Enemy intent, projected capability, I&W events, and inci-
dent trending over time must also be considered. The analyti-
cal red team, with the addition of some physical red team 
members, must address the issue of reactive vs. proactive 
analysis in providing its early warning and decision-support 
functions. This will have a significant impact upon the devel-
opment of suicide bomber threat scenarios for training pur-
poses. A reactive approach would focus upon only what types 
of suicide bombings have been conducted historically—the 
benefit is that it focuses limited monetary resources and red 
team analytical thinking with respect to known threats. A pro-
active approach attempts to project opposing force suicide 
bombing operational patterns into the future—the benefit here 
is that a deployed military force will not be as likely to get 
‘blindsided’ by evolving opposing force suicide bombing tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and other innovations. 
The downside to being proactive is chasing ‘what if scenarios’ 
and squandering analysis and subsequent training time to the 
detriment of preparing against known operational threats. As a 
rule, new Canadian military analytical red teams should focus 
upon reactive analysis and master that discipline before ever 
attempting to take a more proactive approach.17
For the sake of simply showing how the process might 
work, in this instance we will go with the priority suicide 
bomber threat scenarios identified in Table 3. Those scenarios 
with the highest rankings are as follows, and they represent 
the best candidates for physical red teaming:
a. Simple suicide bomber targeting military force at a check-
point.
b. Complex suicide bomber targeting field deployed and on 
patrol military forces.
c. Simple VBIED targeting in convoy military forces.
d. Complex VBIED targeting encamped/barracked military 
forces.
Table 3 - Suicide Bomber Threat Scenarios vs. Activities of a Deployed Military Force  
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Simple Suicide Bomber 
(Individual suicide bomber 
with vest bomb)
Complex Suicide Bomber 
(Multiple individual suicide 
bombers with vest bombs/vari-
ant with active assault element)
Simple VBIED  
(Lone VBIED with  
single driver)
Complex VBIED  
(Multiple VBIEDS/variant 
with active assault element)
Encamped/
Barracked (static) Low Low Medium *Highest
Checkpoint; Road/
Building (static) *Highest Medium Low Low
Field Deployed 
(dynamic)
Medium *Highest Low Low
On Patrol (dynamic) Medium *Highest Low Low
In Convoy (dynamic) Low Low *Highest Medium
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The Physical Red Teaming of Suicide Bomber 
Threat Scenarios  
At this point, the red teaming form shifts over to the physical and role-playing world of red team operators. 
Either cross-trained individuals who are in both the analytical 
and physical red teaming cells will be involved for the sake of 
analytical continuity, or a few analytical red team advisors/
observers will monitor the training to ensure the threat sce-
narios identified are appropriately followed. Two levels of 
training would then take place; a) Canadian military personnel 
undertake physical red team training and engage in suicide 
bombing operations against Canadian (blue) military units, 
and b) the friendly Canadian (blue) military unit in a force 
protection mission going up against the physical red team.
Unfortunately, it is still very 
common for US military forces to 
engage in only “B” level training, 
wherein the friendly forces go up 
against an ad hoc red team thrown 
together without any in-depth 
adversarial knowledge. This is 
typically seen in domestic base 
force protection training, but 
deploying US military units have 
also found themselves in this situ-
ation. A commitment should be 
made by the Canadian military to 
create actual physical red teams, 
and arguments have even been 
made, with much merit, that as 
many deploying troops as possible 
should take at least a week of 
physical red teaming training to 
better ‘know thine enemy’ before 
deploying overseas to Afghanistan. 
Pioneering red team training 
offered for such deploying forces 
was provided by the Terrorism 
Research Center (later purchased 
by Blackwater) under the Mirror 
Image program that began in June 
2002, and provided over 100 train-
ing courses to US, Canadian, and 
allied military, law enforcement, 
and governmental personnel.18 
With the disruptive business and 
ownership changes to Blackwater 
(later Xe), the original training 
team, in 2010, reconstituted itself 
under the Aeneas Group 
International, LLC (AGI) banner, 
and is now offering this training 
under the Terrorism 360 program.19 
No other private entity offers 
red team training of this calibre. 
However, US military programs 
have been stood up such as the 
comprehensive 18 week Red Team 
Leader’s Course which began in 2006 and is provided by the 
US Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural 
Studies (UFMCS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That course 
draws heavily upon anthropology and regional studies in 
addition to unconventional military theory, doctrine, and his-
torical instances of red teaming. Other shorter and more spe-
cialized red teaming courses are now also being offered by 
UFMCS. The intent is to create course graduates with more 
refined critical thinking skills and to develop alternative 
points of view for Army battle staffs deployed overseas in 
such theatres as Iraq and Afghanistan.20 While the UFMCS 
courses will prepare Canadian students to fulfill analytical 
red team roles, it is unknown to what extent physical red team 
training skills, including ideological immersion and role play-
ing, are taught.
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US Army soldiers evaluate casualties after a ‘suicide bomber’ detonated a bomb in a crowd of local 
citizens/soldiers during a training mission at Fort Stewart, Georgia, 28 February 2007.
Two US Army sergeants search the home of a suspected insurgent in Owesat, Iraq, 18 December 2007, 
after finding a grenade and other electronic items in response to a suicide bomber attack.
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Another option to help develop physical red teaming skill 
sets is to engage in basic research and to undertake a literature 
review of what has been written on this train-
ing. The Red Team Journal website <http://
redteamjournal.com/> provides predomi-
nately analytical red teaming information - 
such as the “reciprocal net assessment” 
(RNA) approach, however, links and informa-
tion exist to some physical resources. 
Additionally, US military and intelligence 
agency red cells and law enforcement affili-
ated entities, such as the National Tactical 
Officers Association (NTOA) Project Red, 
can be contacted for subject matter expert 
support. The guide Red Teams and 
Counterterrorism Training, written by 
Stephen Sloan and this author, published in 2011 by University 
of Oklahoma Press, for example focuses upon how to simulate 
active-aggressor forces, including those that may utilize sui-
cide bombers.
Once a bona fide physical red team is created, or under 
some circumstances, a private military red team is contracted, 
the priority suicide bomber threat scenarios identified can be 
simulated. ‘Simunitions’ should be utilized. This allows for 
real weapons to be put into service, however, with barrel con-
versions made so that marking rounds are fired. Simulated 
explosive devices - from inert suicide vests through VBIEDs, 
also have to be obtained or created. The intent is for the 
Canadian military forces to undergo as realistic training as 
possible, and thus ‘train as they fight.’ Pyrotechnics, smoke, 
and other elements can also be brought into play. The creation 
of wounding make up applied to victims, and even recreating 
the sights and smells of an engagement - for example, the 
dumping of animal blood and entrails on a victim requiring 
medical attention - should also be considered as options dur-
ing the simulated suicide bombing attacks against friendly 
forces. Like all forms of 
military training, the vari-
ous protocols are deter-
mined and logically 
thought through, the hard-
ware and necessary sup-
plies procured, and the 
training venues are either 
selected or created. 
Training can take place at 
a central military facility, 
or a mobile training team 
approach can be taken. It 
is important to note that 
simple training should 
always take place before 
more complex training, 
thus the less involved sui-
cide bomber incident sce-
narios should be con-
ducted first. In addition, 
the skill set level exhib-
ited by the red team vis-à-
vis those being trained 
should be initially determined. Sometimes below zone training 
(the red team initially performs below the capabilities of the 
friendly force) may be required as much as in 
zone training (red team parity with the 
friendly force) and above zone training (red 
team superiority over the friendly force), to 
allow training objectives to be met. Training 
is always dynamic, and scripting should be 
followed as little as possible, with basic 
training intent, derived from analytical red 
team guidance, promoted within an atmo-
sphere of free play and improvisation.
After the physical red team is created 
and equipped, the training scenarios are 
developed, the referees and other contingen-
cies are sorted out, and the means by which the training will 
be delivered is determined, the military personnel and units 
taking the training can be focused upon. In this instance, 
Canadian military forces being deploying overseas where 
opposing forces have engaged in suicide bombings would be 
given the highest training priority. These forces can either be 
trained following current Canadian force protection doctrine, 
or the training of this doctrine can become a component of the 
simulated force protection mission when the friendly unit is 
pitted against the physical red team. More competitive unit 
commanders will likely engage in their own force protection 
training even if such doctrinal training is provided when the 
unit is up against the red team.21 While this training is not 
meant to be a ‘win or lose’ proposition for the friendly forces 
-since often failure teaches us far more about personnel and 
unit readiness than success - some form of competition is 
always a good training motivator for the forces being trained. 
After action ‘hot washes’ and ‘lessons learned’ sessions are 
also imperative, with candid criticisms of individual and unit 
performance in the form of constructive feedback utilized to 
promote learning and training takeaways.  
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International peacekeepers investigate the site of a suicide car bomb attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, 28 January 2004.
“Another option to 
help develop physi-
cal red teaming skill 
sets is to engage in 
basic research and 
to undertake a litera-
ture review of what 
has been written on 
this training.”
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Conclusions
This article has demonstrated that the synergistic use of analytical and physical red teams together is extremely 
useful for the force protection training needs of deploying 
Canadian military units overseas in environments such as 
Afghanistan, where the ongoing threat of suicide bombings 
exist. While both forms of red teams may have in the past 
been utilized as ‘stand alone’ options by some military forces 
with success—this is especially true of the US armed ser-
vices— the benefits of utilizing both forms together provide a 
far greater spectrum of force protection competency:
The benefits of analytical red teams include:
•	 Identify I&W Events, Anomalies, and Suicide Bombing 
Trends
•	 Early Warning (defensive; pre-attack alerts)
•	 Futures (offensive; battlespace shaping)
•	 Determining Enemy Intent/Capability
•	 Decision-Support
•	 Reactive and Proactive Strategy Options
•	 Identifying Highest Priority 
Suicide Bomber Threat Scenarios
•	 Analytical Intent Guiding 
Physical Training
The benefits of physical red 
teams include:
•	 Increasing Force Protection 
Training Proficiency
•	 Improved Survivability of the 
Forces Trained
•	 Identifying Training and 
Equipment Deficiencies 
•	 Determining Force Protection 
Doctrinal Shortcomings
•	 Limiting Incidents of Tactical 
Surprise
•	 Red Team Members Gaining Insights into Opposing 
Force Behaviors
Typically, analytical red teaming does not suffer from 
being de-coupled from physical red teaming because it pro-
vides command decision support and intelligence early warn-
ing functions. The training provided by the physical red team, 
however, is greatly enhanced by the analytical rigour of the 
more intelligence and command-focused red team. The ana-
lytical red team will also benefit from its association and links 
to the physical red team because of the feedback that it pro-
vides concerning the severity of the threat when simulated 
under field training conditions.  
Additionally, the utilization of analytical and physical red 
teams is extremely cost effective and should be considered a 
direct ‘force multiplier’ that enhances the survivability of 
deployed forces by making them less vulnerable to suicide 
bomber attacks. Rather than spending limited resources on 
expensive military hardware, the red teaming approach invests 
in the human capital of the Canadian military forces them-
selves by means of enhancing their analytical skills, sharpen-
ing their understanding of the opposing forces they are facing, 
and ‘raising the bar’ for individual soldier and unit force pro-
tection training proficiency.
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Residents gather at the site of a bomb attack at Mwafaqija village in Mosul, Iraq, 10 August 2012.
NOTES
1. The Government of Canada “Red Teaming, Red 
Cells and Analytical Decision Support” project 
statement of work (SOW) [11-0234; 
Q0046BH234] provided background that 
describes two elementary forms of red teaming - 
mimetic red teaming and diegetic red teaming. 
The author has decided to utilize more common 
terminology for these forms of red teaming in this 
article. For a basic introduction to red teaming 
informational resources, see Robert J. Bunker, 
Subject Bibliography: Red Teaming (Quantico, 
VA: FBI Academy Library, December 2008).
2. For information on the earlier use of suicide 
bombings and other forms of suicide operations in 
the Second World War against opposing military 
forces, see Richard O’Neill, Suicide Squads ( 
Sydney: Lansdowne Press, 1981).
3. See May Rivers Films, The Cult of the Suicide 
Bomber (New York, NY: The Disinformation 
Company, Ltd., 2006), DVD, 96 mins. Narrated 
by Robert Baer.
4. These included Hizbollah front and allied groups, 
such as Amal. Surprisingly, one of these groups 
may have engaged in a December 1981 vehicular 
suicide bombing in Lebanon against the Iraqi 
embassy that would have predated the celebrated 
martyrdom of Hossein Fahmideh. See the RAND 
Terrorism Chronology (1968-1997).
5. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Suicide 
Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Land 
Warfare Paper 46W (Arlington, VA: Institute of 
Land Warfare, Association of the US Army, 
September 2004), p. 4.
6. Ibid, p. 5.
7. Ibid, pp. 1-22.
8. These incidents focus on Canadian military fatali-
ties. Numerous incidents of the wounding of 
Canadian soldiers also exist in the various news 
sources reviewed. Per one listing of Canadian 
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A USAF EOD team and US Army soldiers inspect a suicide bomber’s detonated vehicle in Tuz, Iraq, on 17 June 2005, during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
fatalities “154 Canadian soldiers, one Canadian 
reporter, one diplomat and two aid workers have 
been killed since the Canadian military deployed 
to Afghanistan in early 2002.” See “Timeline: 
Canadian deaths in Afghanistan.” Canada.com. 
25 February 2011 at <http://www.canada.com/
news/Timeline+Canadian+deaths+Afghanist
an/1037437/story.html>, accessed 2 March 2011. 
Names of the Canadian military fatalities attrib-
uted to suicide bombings have been validated via 
iCasualties.org. See “Coalition Deaths By 
Nationality; Canada; Operation Enduring 
Freedom.” iCasualties.org at <http://icasualties.
org/oef/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=Canada>, 
accessed 2 March 2011. 
9. Times Wire Reports, “Suicide Bomber Kills 
Canadian Soldier,” in the Los Angeles Times, 27 
January  2004, at <http://articles.latimes.
com/2004/jan/27/world/fg-briefs27>, accessed 2 
March 2011. A variation  on this attack suggests 
that the suicide bomber was carrying an artillery 
shell and detonated next to the vehicle. See Ron 
Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Two Suicide Bombings 
In Kabul Raise Questions About Motives, 
Repercussions,” in Radio Free Europe: Radio 
Liberty. 29 January  2004, at <http://www.rferl.
org/content/article/1051370.html>, accessed 2 
March 2011.
10. Coalition Deaths By Nationality; Canada; 
Operation Enduring Freedom,” in iCasualties.org, 
at <http://icasualties.org/oef/Nationality.
aspx?hndQry=Canada>, accessed 2 March 2011; 
and “Suicide bomber kills TV employee covering 
death of two Canadian soldiers,.” IFEX, 24 July 
2006, at <http://www.ifex.org/afghani-
stan/2006/07/24/suicide_bomber_kills_tv_
employee/>, accessed 2 March 2011. The date is 
listed wrong in this source.
11. “Coalition Deaths By Nationality; Canada; 
Operation Enduring Freedom,” in iCasualties.org, 
at <http://icasualties.org/oef/Nationality.
aspx?hndQry=Canada >, (accessed 2 March 2011). 
12. Ibid.
13. “Bike bomb kills 4 Canadian troops, ” in CNN 
World, at < http://articles.cnn.com/2006-09-18/
world/afghanistan_1_canadian-soldiers-pan-
j w a y i - d i s t r i c t - s u i c i d e - b o m b e r ? _
s=PM:WORLD>, accessed 2 March 2011.
14. “Two Canadian soldiers killed by suicide bomb-
er.” News Release. CEFCOM/COMFEC 
NR–06.032 – 28 November 2006, at <http://www.
cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/nr-sp/doc-eng.
asp?id=2150>, accessed 2 March 2011.
15. Matthew Fisher, “Canadian colonel dies in attack 
on NATO convoy in Kabul,” in the National Post, 
Tuesday, 18 May  2010, at <http://www.national-
post .com/news/s tory.html?id=3041858>, 
accessed 2 March 2011.
16. These datasets include Appendix: Chronology of 
Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Robert J.Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Suicide 
Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Land 
Warfare Paper No. 46W (Arlington, VA: The 
Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the 
United States Army, September 2004), pp. 15-19; 
Palestinian Suicide Bombings since 1993, 
Mohammed M Hafez,. Manufacturing Human 
Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide 
Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace, 2006), pp.79-86; Appendix 1: Suicide 
Terrorist Campaigns, 1980-2003. Robert A. Pape, 
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism (New York, NY: Random House, 2005), 
pp. 253-264; RAND Database of Worldwide 
Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), at< http://www.
rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html>; 
SATP Suicide Attacks by the LTTE, at< http://
www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/data-
base/data_suicide_killings.htm>; START Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD). http://www.start.
umd.edu/gtd/; Table 1: Successful Suicide 
Bombers and Table 2: Unsuccessful Suicide 
Bombers. Debra D. Zedalis,  Female Suicide 
Bombers. Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, June 2004), pp.3-6; Appendix 
One: Chronology of Attacks at < http://www.hrw.
o r g / l e g a c y / r e p o r t s / 2 0 0 2 / i s r l - p a /
ISRAELPA1002-08.htm#P1290_377952>; 
Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks 
Against Israeli Civilians (New York, NY: Human 
Rights Watch, 2002).  
17. The author had been involved in a multi-year 
strategic level projection of Al Qaeda use of body 
cavity suicide bombs against high value targets. 
Al Qaeda utilized such a device in Saudi Arabia in 
August 2009 in a failed assassination attempt 
against the Saudi Prince who was head of the 
Kingdom’s counter-terrorism operations. It takes 
years of analytical training to become competent 
in proactive analytical red teaming activities.
18. The author took this physical red teaming training 
in 2005. It was innovative and extremely useful in 
nature. For a video overview of this training - 
which took place while the author was in atten-
dance -  see “Mirror Image Training on CNN, ” in 
Devost.net. 20 May 2005, at < http://www.devost.
net/2005/05/20/mirror-image-on-cnn/>, (accessed 
10 March 2011). Mirror Image statistics provided 
by Betty O’Hearn on 10 March 2011 during a 
telephone conversation.
19. The AGI website is at <http://www.agi3.com/>. 
Disclosure: The author has been contacted by 
AGI in the recent past concerning providing con-
sulting services for Mexican cartel immersion 
training and other professional activities.
20. See “Chapter 6: The Red Team: Developing an 
Adversarial Perspective,” Stephen Sloan and 
Robert J. Bunker, Red Teams and Counterterrorism 
Training (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2011). 
21. This insight comes from lessons learned from the 
National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, 
California, when unit commander’s rotated 
against the Krasnovian (OPFOR) armoured forces 
sought to defeat them on their own turf. 
